Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) developed from the work of clinical epidemiologists at McMaster University and Oxford University in the 1970s and 1980s and self-consciously presented itself as a "new paradigm" called "evidencebased medicine" in the early 1990s. The techniques of the randomized controlled trial, systematic review and meta-analysis have produced an extensive and powerful body of research. They have also generated a critical literature that raises general concerns about its methods. This paper is a systematic review of the critical literature. It finds the description of EBM as a Kuhnian paradigm helpful and worth taking further. Three kinds of criticism are evaluated in detail: criticisms of procedural aspects of EBM (especially from Cartwright, Worrall and Howick), data showing the greater than expected fallibility of EBM (Ioaanidis and others), and concerns that EBM is incomplete as a philosophy of science (Ashcroft and others). The paper recommends a more instrumental or pragmatic approach to EBM, in which any ranking of evidence is done by reference to the actual, rather than the theoretically expected, reliability of results. Emphasis on EBM has eclipsed other necessary research methods in medicine. With the recent emphasis on translational medicine, we are seeing a restoration of the recognition that clinical research requires an engagement with basic theory (e.g. physiological, genetic, biochemical) and a range of empirical techniques such as bedside observation, laboratory and animal studies. EBM works best when used in this context.
Introduction
Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) 1 is the application of methods of clinical epidemiology to the practice of medicine more generally. It was inspired by the post-World War II work of Archibald Cochrane, developed from the work of clinical epidemiologists at McMaster University and Oxford University in the 1970s and 1980s, and self-consciously presented as a "new paradigm" called "evidence-based medicine" in the early 1990s (Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group 1992) . EBM was embraced in Canada and the UK in the 1990s, received with some ambivalence in the United States, and adopted in many other countries, both developed and developing (Daly 2005) . Its techniques of population based studies and systematic review have produced an extensive and powerful body of knowledge about medical diagnosis and treatment. A canonical and helpful definition of EBM 2 is that of Davidoff et al. (Davidoff et al. 1995) in an editorial in the British Medical Journal:
"In essence, evidence based medicine is rooted in five linked ideas: firstly, clinical decisions should be based on the best available scientific evidence; secondly, the clinical problem -rather than habits or protocols -should determine the type of evidence to be sought; thirdly, identifying the best evidence means using epidemiological and biostatistical ways of thinking; fourthly, conclusions derived from identifying and critically appraising evidence are useful only if put into action in managing patients or making health care decisions; and, finally, performance should be constantly evaluated." EBM regards its own epistemic techniques as superior to other more traditional methods such as clinical experience, expert opinion, and physiological reasoning. This is because the more traditional techniques are viewed as more fallible. There is not one new technique, but several. The following are typically regarded as part of EBM:
1. Rigorous design of clinical trials, especially the randomized controlled trial (RCT) . The RCT is to be used wherever physically and ethically feasible. The trial should be double-masked (traditionally, "double-blinded" 3 ) wherever possible. 2. Systematic evidence review and meta-analysis, including grading of the evidence in "evidence hierarchies." 3. Outcome measures (leading to suggestions for improvement)
The RCT has often been described as the "gold standard" of evidence for effectiveness of medical interventions. It is a powerful technique, originally developed by the geneticist R.A. Fisher and applied for the first time in a medical context by A. Bradford Hill's 1948 evaluation of streptomycin for tuberculosis (Doll et al. 1999) . The double-masked RCT is designed to control for the placebo effect, for selection and other confounding biases, and for confirmation biases.
EBM also includes systematic and formal techniques for combining the results of different clinical trials. A systematic review does a thorough search of the literature and an evaluation and grading of clinical trials. An evidence hierarchy is typically used to structure the judgments of quality and strength of evidence. Meta-analysis integrates the actual data from different but similar high-quality trials to give an overall single statistical result.
Often, EBM is supplemented with formal techniques from Medical Decision Making (MDM) such as risk/benefit calculations. The risk/benefit calculations can be made for individual patients, making use of patient judgments of utility, or they can be made in the context of health care economics, for populations. MDM seeks to avoid common errors of judgment, such as availability and salience biases, in medical decision making. 4 The overall project is to use the techniques of EBM (and sometimes also MDM) to construct practice guidelines and to take care of individual patients. Each technique-the RCT, other high quality clinical trials, meta-analysis and systematic review-is based on its own core technical successes. The techniques fit together, and share a reliance on statistics, probability theory and utility theory. Journals, centers, clearinghouses, collaborations, educational programs, textbooks, committees and governments all produce and disseminate EBM.
EBM rose to dominance right after the prominence of consensus conferences for assessment of complex and sometimes conflicting evidence and may have been partly responsible for the decline of traditional consensus conferences. As late as 1990, an Institute of Medicine report evaluating the international uses of medical consensus conferences said "Group judgment methods are perhaps the most widely used means of assessment of medical technologies in many countries" (Baratz et al. 1990) . Just a few years later, expert consensus is viewed in the same medical circles as the lowest level of evidence, when it is included in the evidence at all. For example, the Canadian Task force on Preventive Health Care which began in 1979 as a consensus conference program now explicitly declares "Evidence takes precedence over consensus" (Canadian Task Force on Preventive Health Care).
EBM has not completely replaced group judgment, however. Consensus conferences (or something similar) are often still used for producing evidencebased guidelines or policy, that is, for translating a systematic review into a practical recommendation. And group judgment may be needed to set the standards to be used in systematic review. I will comment on this continued reliance on consensus methods later in the paper.
There is some indication that EBM is now past its peak, and being overshadowed in part by a new approach, that of "translational medicine" (Woolf 2008) . Considerable resources from the NIH, from the European Commission and from the National Institute for Health Research in the UK have been redirected to "bench to bedside and back" research, which is typically the research that takes place before the clinical trials that are core to EBM. Donald Berwick, the founder of the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (which is the leading organization for quality improvement in healthcare), now claims that "we have overshot the mark" with EBM and created an "intellectual hegemony" that excludes important research methods from recognition (Berwick 2005) . Berwick calls the overlooked methods "pragmatic science" and sees them as crucial for scientific discovery. He mentions the same sorts of approaches (use of local knowledge, exploration of hypotheses) that "translational medicine" advocates describe. After the discussions in this paper, some reasons for the recent turn to translational medicine will become clearer.
There is a vast literature on evidence-based medicine, most consisting of systematic evidence reviews for particular health care questions. A substantial portion of the literature, however, is a critical engagement with EBM as a whole, pointing out both difficulties and limitations. These discussions come from outsiders as well as insiders to the field of EBM. My goal in this paper is to do something like a systematic review of this literature, discerning the kinds of criticisms that seem cogent and presenting them in a structured manner. EBM, like all methodologies in medicine, has both core strengths and limitations. I will begin with an overview of some general social and philosophical characteristics of EBM, and then turn to the criticisms.
EBM as a "Kuhnian paradigm"
When the Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group described themselves as having a "new paradigm" of medical knowledge (Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group 1992), they particularly had in mind Kuhn's (1962) characterization of a paradigm as setting the standards for what is to count as admissible evidence. 5 EBM assessments make use of an "evidence hierarchy" (often called "levels of evidence") in which higher levels of evidence are regarded as of higher quality than lower levels of evidence. A typical evidence hierarchy 6 puts double-masked (or "double-blinded") RCTs at the top, or perhaps right after meta-analyses or systematic reviews of RCTs. Unmasked RCTs come next, followed by well designed case controlled or cohort studies and then observational studies and case reports. Expert opinion, expert consensus, clinical experience and physiological rationale are at the bottom. The rationale for the evidence hierarchy is that higher levels of evidence are thought to avoid biases that are present in the lower levels of evidence. Specifically, randomization avoids selection and other confounding biases (but see (Worrall 2007b) ) and masking helps to distinguish real from placebo effects (but see (Howick 2008; Howick 2011) ) and avoid confirmation bias. Powering the trial with sufficient numbers of participants and using statistical tools avoids the salience and availability biases that can skew informal assessments and unsystematic clinical experience. Ultimately, trial results are graded for both quality and strength of evidence.
The language of Kuhnian paradigms has been overused and become somewhat clichéd, meaning something like "transformational new theory" in the typical quote from the EBM Working Group cited in the previous paragraph. In fact, EBM has many characteristics of a traditional Kuhnian paradigm, 7 having all three of the characteristics of a Kuhnian paradigm discerned by Margaret Masterman (Lakatos and Musgrave 1970) and agreed to by Kuhn (Kuhn et al. 2000) . These characteristics 8 are helpful for understanding the import of EBM. First, EBM is a social movement with associated institutions such as Evidence-Based Practice Centers, official collaborations, textbooks, courses and journals. It is also, secondly, a general philosophy of medicine, defining both the questions of interest and the appropriate evidence. It is seen as the central methodology of medicine by its practitioners and as an unwelcome politically dominant movement by its detractors (e.g. (Charlton and Miles 1998; Denny 1999) ). And third (sometimes overlooked by those who use Kuhn's term "paradigm"), it is characterized by a core of technical results and successful exemplars that have been extended over time. Kuhn referred to such exemplars as "concrete puzzle solutions…employed as models or examples" (Kuhn 1970) and later as a "disciplinary matrix" including "symbolic generalization, models and exemplars" (Kuhn 1977) . He regards this third meaning as the original and fundamental meaning of the term "paradigm" (Kuhn 1977) .
Contrary to appearances and self-presentation, this core of technical results is not produced by a general algorithm or set of precise methodological rules. One of the things that Kuhn emphasized about paradigms is that they are driven primarily by exemplars, and not by rules. He writes (Kuhn 1970 ) that exemplars are "one sort of element…the concrete puzzle-solutions employed as exemplars which can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science. Kuhn argued that this is significant because the rules are not the basis for the development of the science. Rather, Kuhn argues, less precise judgments about similarity of examples are used (Kuhn 1977) .
The medical RCT traces its beginning to A. Bradford Hill's 1948 evaluation of streptomycin for tuberculosis (Doll et al. 1999) . It was initially resisted by many physicians used to treating each patient individually, therapeutically and with confidence in treatment choice (Marks 1997) . Nevertheless, important trials such as the polio vaccine field trial of 1954 and the 1955 evaluation of treatments for rheumatic fever helped bring the RCT into routine use (Meldrum 1998; Meldrum 2000) . In 1970 the RCT achieved official status in the USA with inclusion in the new FDA requirements for pharmaceutical testing (Meldrum 2000) . One of the most well-known early successful uses of RCTs was the 1980s international study of aspirin and streptokinase for the prevention of myocardial infarction. However, not all early use of the RCT was straightforward or successful: the 1960s-1970s NCI randomized controlled trial of lumpectomy versus mastectomy for early stage breast cancer was not masked, 9 yet it was highly regarded, and the attempt to conduct a Diet-Heart study in the 1960s was hampered and finally frustrated by the difficulties in implementing major changes in diet in one arm of the study (Marks 1997) . This is an example of the finding that the methodology of the RCT does not readily apply to all the situations in which we might wish to use it. As Kuhn might put it, normal science is not a matter of simple repetition of the paradigm case; it requires minor or major tinkering, and sometimes ends in frustration (or what Kuhn would call an "anomaly").
There are also variations in the design and analyses of RCTs. For example, some trials do an "intention to treat" analysis, dropping no experimental subjects from the trial, even if they fail to go through the course of treatment, and some trials do a "per-protocol" analysis in which only patients who complete the trial are included in the final results. Some trails have a placebo in the control arm and some trials have an established treatment in the control arm. It is often said that design and evaluation of an RCT requires "judgment" (see for example (Rawlins 2008)) ; by this what is meant is that trials cannot be designed by a universal set of rules and that the design and evaluation of trials requires domain expertise, not only statistical expertise. For example, domain expertise is needed in order to design both the dosage and the intervention in the control arm, and domain expertise is needed in order to specify appropriate trial selection criteria.
The same insights apply to systematic reviews and meta-analyses. The first systematic review is often identified as the Oxford Database of Perinatal Trials 1989 study of corticosteroids for fetal lung development; this study was the basis for the development of the Cochrane Collaboration in 1993 which has since then done over 3,000 systematic reviews. Other organizations producing systematic reviews include the Agency for Health Care Research and Quality (AHRQ) and its fourteen Evidence-Based Practice Centers and the American College of Physicians (ACP) Journal Club. All systematic reviews use evidence hierarchies, but there is some variation in the hierarchies in use. The RCT is always at the top or just below metaanalyses of RCTs, but there are variations in where other kinds of studies are ranked, and in whether or not animal trials, basic science and expert opinion are included. Hierarchical rank is just one measure of the quality of a trial, which needs to be considered together with other measures of quality such as how well the trial handles withdrawals and how well it is randomized and masked. In 2002 the AHRQ reported forty systems of rating in use, six of them within its own network of evidence-based practice centers (AHRQ 2002) . The GRADE Working Group, established in 2000, is attempting to reach consensus on one system of rating the quality and strength of evidence (Guyatt et al. 2008) . This is an ironic development, given that EBM intends to replace group judgment methods! Meta-analysis combines the results of several high-quality trials to get an overall measure of strength of evidence. It requires judgments about the similarity of trials for combination and the quality of evidence in each trial, as well as about the possibility of systematic bias in the evidence overall, for example due to publication bias and pharmaceutical company support. Meta-analysis is a formal technique, but not an algorithmic one: judgments need to be made about trial quality (as with systematic reviews, use of an evidence hierarchy is part of the process) and similarity of trial endpoints or other aspects of studies. Different meta-analyses of the same data have produced different conclusions (Juni et al. 1999; Yank et al. 2007 ). Steven Goodman (2002) is concerned that the disagreement between meta-analyses, specifically in the case of mammography screening, represents a "crisis for EBM." I think it is not so much a crisis as a reminder of the limits of EBM.
The identification of EBM with a Kuhnian paradigm, useful though it is, should not be taken too scrupulously. Exemplars and judgments of similarity are important, but rules also play a role. Kuhnian claims about incommensurability between paradigms and the social constitution of objectivity are controversial here and would certainly be denied by practitioners of EBM. 10 We have moved on from Kuhn's ideas, revolutionary in the 1960s, but now built upon and transformed in more sophisticated ways.
Critical discussions of EBM
Critical discussions of EBM tend to focus on questioning the procedural necessity and sufficiency of the technical requirements (especially for the RCT), the reliability of EBM in practice, or on EBM's explicit or implicit claims to be a general philosophy of medicine. I'll examine these three areas in turn.
Criticisms of procedural aspects of EBM
Many of these criticisms of EBM procedures have come from British philosophers of science associated with the London School of Economics. Their main approach is to argue that the "gold standard" (the double-masked RCT) is neither necessary (Howick 2011; Worrall 2007b ) nor sufficient (Cartwright 2010) for clinical research. They argue that RCTs do not always control for the biases they are intended to control, they do not produce reliably generalizable knowledge, or they can be unnecessary constraints on clinical testing. These arguments are theoretical and abstract in character, although they are sometimes illustrated by examples. I distinguish them from arguments that RCTs have difficulties in practice, that is, from evaluation of RCTs based on the actual outcomes of such studies, which will be discussed in the next subsection (3B).
John Worrall (2002 Worrall ( , 2007a Worrall ( , 2007b argues that randomization is just one way, and an imperfect way, of controlling for confounding factors that might produce bias. The problem is that randomization can control only for most but not for all confounding factors. When there are indefinitely many factors, both known and unknown, which may lead to bias, chances are that any one randomization will not randomize with respect to all these factors. Under these circumstances, Worrall concludes, chances are that any particular clinical trial will have at least one kind of bias, making the experimental group relevantly different from the control group, just by accident. The only way to avoid this is to re-randomize and do another clinical trial, which may, again by chance, eliminate the first trial's confounding bias but introduce another. Worrall concludes that the RCT does not yield reliable results unless it is repeated time and again, re-randomizing each time, and the results are aggregated and analyzed overall. This is practically speaking impossible. In context, Worrall is less worried about the reliability of RCTs than he is about the assumption that they are much more reliable-in a different epistemic class-than e.g. welldesigned observational ("historically controlled") studies in which there is no randomization. He is arguing that the RCT should be taken off its pedestal and that all trials can have inadvertent bias due to differences between the control and the experimental group.
In a series of articles, Nancy Cartwright (2007a Cartwright ( ,b, 2009 Cartwright ( , 2010 points out that RCTs may have internal validity, but their external validity and hence their applicability to real world questions is dependent on the similarity of the test population and context to the population and context targeted by the intervention. For example, she cites the failure of the California class-size reduction program, which was based on the success of a RCT in Tennessee, as due to failure of external validity (Cartwright 2009 ). She does not give a medical example of actual failure of external validity (hence my classification of her criticisms of EBM as theoretical in character), although she gives one of possible failure: prophylactic antibiotic treatment of children with HIV in developing countries. UNAIDS and UNICEF 2005 treatment recommendations were based on the results of a 2004 RCT in Zaire. Cartwright is concerned that the Zaire results will not generalize to resource-poor settings across other countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Cartwright 2007b ) Concern about external validity is reasonable and there are classic medical examples of lack of external validity. For example, some recommendations for the treatment of heart disease, developed in trials of men only, do not apply to women. There is a history of challenges to RCTs on the grounds that they have excluded certain groups from participation (e.g. women, the elderly, children) yet are used for general health recommendations. The exclusions are made on epistemic and/or ethical grounds. These days, women are less likely to be excluded because the NIH and other granting organizations require their participation in almost all clinical trials, but other exclusions, such as those based on age, remain. Cartwright expresses the concern about external validity in its most general form. In her most recent work (Cartwright 2010) she describes four conditions that need to be met for external validity. 11 These four conditions demand considerable domain knowledge i.e. knowledge of the particular causal interactions that the intervention relies upon.
Jeremy Howick (2008 Howick ( , 2011 argues that masking is not useful outside of contexts in which outcomes are measured subjectively and that masking is both impossible and unnecessary when dealing with large effect size. It is impossible when dealing with large effect size because the effects of the drug unmask the assignment. He also argues that masking is in practice inadequate for placebo controlled trials, since participants can usually tell through the presence of side effects whether or not they are receiving an active intervention.
These three sets of criticisms by Worrall, Cartwright and Howick are significant, and I evaluate them next, beginning with Worrall's papers. Randomization is unlikely to control for confounding factors only in the event that there are many unrelated population variables that influence outcome, because only in that complex case is one of those variables likely to be accidentally unbalanced by the randomization. Worrall considers only the abstract possibility of multiple unknown variables; he does not consider the likely relationship (correlation) of those variables with one another and he does not give us reason to think that, in practice, randomization generally (rather than rarely) leaves some causally relevant population variables accidentally selected for and thereby able to bias the outcome. 12 In addition, successful replication adds evidence that any confounder inadvertently introduced is not causally responsible for the outcome.
Cartwright uses examples from education, economics and international development to show lack of external validity. In general, her examples show failures of interventions to generalize, often because of cultural differences between populations. External validity in medical trials is more explored territory. We typically already know, from some of the trial selection criteria, where the controversies about generalization lie (see also Table 2 in Rawlins (2008) , which sets out the problems with generalization). This does not mean that we can figure out the domain of application of trial results in a simple or formulaic manner. Domain expertise is essential for projection, as of course Nelson Goodman argued long ago (1955). Cartwright's four conditions (2010) have a role here as non-formal criteria for assessing external validity. It should also be noted that Cartwright's discussion applies broadly to experimental and evidential reasoning and not specifically to trial methodology. It is not a specific criticism of RCTs, although because of what she calls the "vanity of rigor" of EBM (Cartwright 2007a ), the criticism is especially pertinent to RCTs.
Howick is correct that masking is important only for detecting small effects with subjectively measured outcomes, but this is (unfortunately) true of many recent advances in medicine and therefore widely applicable. It is not often that we have a new intervention with the dramatic success of e.g. insulin for diabetes or surgery for acute appendicitis. Howick is right to see that the methodology of the RCT is suited for some interventions and not suited for others, but the methodology is, in fact, suited for many if not most of the health care interventions currently in development.
The approaches used by Worrall, Cartwright and Howick argue that the RCT is neither a necessary nor a sufficient method for getting knowledge from clinical trials. They argue that other methods can be equally or more effective in specific circumstances and that knowledge from trials always involves projection to untested domains. EBM enthusiasts are beginning to acknowledge this sensible moderation of their views, as the recent Harveian Oration by Sir Michael Rawlins 13 shows (Rawlins 2008) . In this paper, Rawlins argues that "the notion that evidence can be reliably placed in hierarchies is illusory," that "striking effects can be discerned without the need for RCTs" and that the findings of RCTs should be extrapolated with caution.
Granting these qualifications puts EBM in the same category as other successful scientific methodologies. They are useful tools in the domains in which they work, but they do not work everywhere or always.
Effectiveness of EBM methods in practice
How reliable is EBM in practice? RCT and meta-analyses generate claims with stated confidence levels. Typically, RCTs give 95% confidence levels and metaanalyses much higher confidence levels. It follows that each RCT has a 5% chance of producing a false positive (and each meta-analysis much less). Yet, in practice, RCTs and meta-analyses are much more fallible.
Ioannidis (2005) did a study of 59 highly cited original research studies. Less than half (44%) were replicated; 16% were contradicted by subsequent studies and 16% found the effect to be smaller than in the original study; the rest were not repeated or challenged. Another, more well known statistic is that studies funded by pharmaceutical companies-even when properly masked and of highest qualityhave an astonishingly higher chance (three or four times the probability of studies not funded by pharmaceutical companies) of showing effectiveness of an intervention than studies not funded by pharmaceutical companies (Als-Nielsen et al. 2003; Bekelman et al. 2003; Bero et al. 2007; Lexchin et al. 2003) . And LeLorier et al. (LeLorier et al. 1997) found that 35% of the time, the outcome of RCTs is not predicted accurately by previous meta-analysis. This is a large and partly unexplained failure rate. Some suggest that factors such as publication bias, time to publication bias and pharmaceutical funding bias (which subtly affects trial design and evaluation) are responsible for the worse-thanexpected track record of RCTs, systematic reviews and meta-analyses. Publication bias occurs when studies with null or negative results 14 are not written up or not accepted for publication because they are wrongly thought to be of less scientific significance. Steps to address this bias have been taken in many areas of medical research by creating trial registries and making the results of all trials public. Time to publication bias is a more recently discovered phenomenon: trials with null or negative results, even when they are published, take much longer than trials with positive results (6-8 years for null or negative results compared with 4-5 years for positive results) (Hopewell et al. 2007) . It is possible that steps taken to correct for publication bias will also help correct for time to publication bias.
The additional bias created by pharmaceutical funding is not fully understood, especially since many of these trials are properly randomized and double-masked and satisfy rigorous methodological criteria. Some suggest that pharmaceutical companies deliberately select a weak control arm, for example by selecting a low dose of the standard treatment, giving the new drug a greater chance of relative success. There can also be biases that enter into the analysis of data, particularly when endpoints are not specified in advance. It is hoped that a clinical trials registry will help correct for publication bias and ex post facto manipulation of endpoints. However, at present we are a long way from correcting for bias created by pharmaceutical funding. 15 Disclosure of funding source is helpful for evaluation, but often this information is lost in systematic review and meta-analysis.
Since the performance of RCTs is so flawed, it is worth asking the question whether other kinds of clinical trials, further down the evidence hierarchy, are even less reliable. This would be expected in the abstract, since the further down the evidence hierarchy, the more possible sources of bias. Studies by Benson and Hartz (2000) and Concato et al. (2000) find that many well-designed observational studies produce the same results as RCTs. 16 The matter is controversial, but a recent article by Ian Shrier et al. strongly argues for the inclusion of observational studies in systematic reviews and meta-analyses (Shrier et al. 2007) This result corroborates the intervention of early AIDS activists, who argued against the imposition of RCTs for AZT on both ethical and epistemic grounds (Epstein 1996) . They argued that such trials are morally objectionable in that they deprive the individuals in the placebo arm of the only hope for a cure (at that time). And they argued that such trials are epistemically unnecessary because an RCT is not the only way to discern the effectiveness of anti-retroviral drugs-a claim that, in hindsight, has proved correct as a combination of historical controlled trials and laboratory studies have provided the knowledge of dramatically effective antiretrovirals in clinical use today. These days, of course, no-one needs to get a placebo, and RCTs can continue to detect small improvements of protocol without such strenuous moral objections.
Finally, EBM has been asked to evaluate itself using its own standards of evaluation This would involve showing not merely that a specific EBM intervention improves outcomes, but that more general use of systematic evidence reviews and so forth in clinical decision making results in improved outcomes for patients. In theory, we would of course expect improved outcomes. But what matters here is not theory but practice, and no-one has yet designed or carried out a study to test this (Charlton and Miles 1998; Cohen et al. 2004; Straus and McAlister 2000) .
Criticisms of EBM as a general philosophy of medicine
Like most paradigms (new ways of knowing) the light shone on the paradigm flatters it and puts everything else into the shadows. Critics have protested, variously, that EBM overlooks the role of clinical experience, expert judgment, intuition, medical authority, patient goals and values, local health care constraints and the basic medical sciences including the structure of theory and the relations of causation. This is a long and complex list of intertwined scientific, hermeneutic, political and ethical considerations. Perhaps the most common criticism of EBM is that it deals with statistical results, and application of those results to particular cases is said to require a different set of skills (e.g. (Cohen et al. 2004; Feinstein and Horwitz 1997; Hampton 2002; Straus and McAlister 2000; Tonelli 1998) ). EBM advocates dispute this, and this is the reason for the early redefinition of the enterprise: "Evidencebased medicine is the conscientious, explicit and judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients" (Sackett et al. 1996) . Sorting out this complicated dispute is beyond the scope of this paper; I do so elsewhere (Solomon, in progress) .
Another common complaint, which covers several specific complaints, is that EBM is a scientific approach that overlooks the "art" of medicine (e.g. (Montgomery 2006; Tonelli 1998) . Elsewhere I have argued that the traditional dichotomy between the "art" and the "science" of medicine is no longer helpful (Solomon 2008) . This paper focuses on what EBM leaves out, rather than on whether to count that as art or as science.
In this subsection I will focus on the persistent criticism that EBM ignores the basic sciences that guide both research and clinical practice (Ashcroft 2004; Bluhm 2005; Charlton and Miles 1998; Cohen et al. 2004; Harari 2001; Tonelli 1998) . Basic sciences guide research in suggesting hypotheses about disease processes and mechanisms for action of interventions. Basic sciences guide clinical practice in helping physicians tailor the results of epidemiological studies to the needs of particular patients, who may have unique physiological and pathological conditions. EBM is scientifically superficial: it measures correlations. EBM does not model or theorize about the complete organism, still less the complete organism in its social and environmental context. In terms of scientific theory, it is thin; what some have called "empiricistic" (Harari 2001 ). 17 Charlton and Miles (1998) claim that it is "statistical rather than scientific." Ashcroft writes that EBM is "autonomous of the basic sciences" and "blind to mechanisms of explanation and causation" (2004, p. 134 ). Ashcroft regards this as an advantage, rather than a disadvantage, because it means that EBM does not have to worry that our basic theories may be incorrect. Ashcroft allies himself with Nancy Cartwright's realism about phenomenal laws and antirealism about deeper laws 18 at this point. Others, however, see the eschewing of scientific theorizing in favor of discovery of robust statistical correlations as problematic (Harari 2001; Tonelli 2006) . They consider theorizing as important to medicine as it is to the pure sciences.
Whatever one's views about scientific realism, EBM typically depends upon a background of basic science research that develops the interventions and suggests the appropriate protocols. It is rare for an intervention without physiological rationale to be tested (although this does happen, especially in the areas of complementary and alternative medicine, but in these cases there is typically an alternative rationale, perhaps in the frameworks of Asian metaphysics). Moreover, as discussed above, scientific judgment enters into the design of appropriate randomized controlled trials (choice of control, test population etc.) and into the interpretation of the applicability of results (external validity). Of course, many interventions with excellent physiological rationales and good in vitro and in vivo performance fail when tested in human beings or fail when tested for external validity. That does not mean that there is anything wrong with physiological reasoning or that we can use a more reliable method. The basic science work is fallible, but it is not dispensable. Even Nancy Cartwright (1989) would agree that we cannot replace physical theory with phenomenal laws alone.
In the past 5 years a new approach to medical research has risen to prominence internationally: what is called "translational medicine," to be achieved by creating research centers, as well as journals, conferences, training programs and so forth. The NIH has made it a priority in its "Roadmap" in 2004 and started offering Clinical and Translational Science Awards in 2006. 55 Institutes have been created (as of May 2011), mostly in universities and medical centers, and the NIH hopes to fund 60, at a total cost of $500 million annually. The European Commission plans to use most of its billion Euro a year budget for the next few years for translational research. In the UK, the National Institute for Health Research has established 11 centers at a total cost of about 100 million pounds annually. The idea behind translational medicine is to facilitate greater interaction between basic science research and research in clinical medicine. 19 The buzzwords are "synergize," "catalyze" and "interdisciplinary." The idea is to bring the different researchers and their laboratories into greater physical proximity. This is an interesting retrointervention in these days of global electronic communication and global travel.
From the perspective of the discussion in this section, the development of translational medicine or something like it was only a matter of time. EBM has such high claims to scientific objectivity that it attracted much talent and effort from clinical researchers. Perhaps the increased focus on formal epidemiological work eventually made apparent what was left out, namely engagement with substantial physiological and biomolecular theories. The model of basic science doing the research and clinical researchers testing the products is now perceived as limited; actually, it leaves all the fun and the creativity to the basic researchers, and deprives them of the input of clinical knowledge and observations from the clinical researchers.
Conclusions
EBM gives a set of formal techniques for evaluating the effectiveness of clinical interventions. The techniques are powerful, especially when evaluating interventions that offer incremental advantages to current standards of care, and especially when the determination of success has subjective elements. EBM techniques do not deliver the reliability that is theoretically and statistically expected from them. Results are compromised by publication bias, time to publication bias, interests of funding organizations and other unknown factors. Maintaining a strict evidence hierarchy makes little sense when the actual reliability of "gold standard" evidence is so much less than the expected reliability. I recommend a more instrumental or pragmatic approach to EBM, in which any ranking of evidence is done by reference to the actual, rather than the theoretically expected, reliability of results. So, for example, RCTs and observational trials might be at the same level in the hierarchy (based on their comparable reliability in practice) and trials designed and funded by pharmaceutical companies a level below independent trials (irrespective of apparent trial rigor, based on their track record of biased outcomes).
Emphasis on EBM has eclipsed other necessary research methods in medicine, even those methods necessary for its own development and application. With the recent emphasis on translational medicine, we are seeing a restoration of the recognition that clinical research requires an engagement with basic theory (e.g. physiological, genetic, biochemical) and a range of empirical techniques such as bedside observation, laboratory and animal studies. EBM works best when used in this pluralistic methodological context.
Evidence-Based Medicine
A New Approach to Teaching the Practice of Medicine Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group A NEW paradigm for medical practice is emerging. Evidence-based medicine de-emphasizes intuition, unsystematic clinical experience, and pathophysiologic rationale as sufficient grounds for clinical decision making and stresses the examination of evidence from clinical research. Evidence-based medicine requires new skills of the physician, including efficient literature searching and the application of formal rules of evidence evaluating the clinical literature.
An important goal of our medical residency program is to educate physicians in the practice of evidence-based medicine. Strategies include a weekly, formal academic half-day for residents, devoted to learning the necessary skills; recruitment into teaching roles of physicians who practice evidence-based medicine; sharing among faculty of approaches to teaching evidence-based medicine; and providing faculty with feedback on their performance as role models and teachers of evidence-based medicine. The influence of evidencebased medicine on clinical practice and medical education is increasing.
CLINICAL SCENARIO
A junior medical resident working in a teaching hospital admits a 43-year-old previously well man who experienced a witnessed grand mal seizure. He had never had a seizure before and had not had any recent head trauma. He drank alcohol once or twice a week and had not had alcohol on the day of the seizure. Findings on physical examination are normal. The patient is given a loading A complete list of members of the Evidenced-Based Medicine Working Group appears at the end of this article. dose of phenytoin intravenously and the drug is continued orally. A computed tomographic head scan is completely nor¬ mal, and an electroencephalogram shows only nonspecific findings. The patient is very concerned about his risk of seizure recurrence. How might the resident proceed? The Way of the Past Faced with this situation as a clinical clerk, the resident was told by her se¬ nior resident (who was supported in his view by the attending physician) that the risk of seizure recurrence is high (though he could not put an exact num¬ ber on it) and that was the information that should be conveyed to the patient. She now follows this path, emphasizing to the patient not to drive, to continue his medication, and to see his family physician in follow-up. The patient leaves in a state of vague trepidation about his risk of subsequent seizure. The Way of the Future The resident asks herself whether she knows the prognosis of a first seizure and realizes she does not. She proceeds to the library and, using the Grateful Med program,1 conducts a computerized literature search. She enters the Med¬ ical Subject Headings terms epilepsy, prognosis, and recurrence, and the pro¬ gram retrieves 25 relevant articles. Sur¬ veying the titles, one2 appears directly relevant. She reviews the paper, finds that it meets criteria she has previously learned for a valid investigation of prog¬ nosis,3 and determines that the results are applicable to her patient. The search costs the resident $2.68, and the entire process (including the trip to the library and the time to make a photocopy of the article) took half an hour.
Reprint requests to
The results of the relevant study show that the patient risk of recurrence at 1
year is between 43% and 51%, and at 3 years the risk is between 51% and 60%.
After a seizure-free period of 18 months his risk of recurrence would likely be less than 20%. She conveys this infor¬ mation to the patient, along with a rec¬ ommendation that he take his medica¬ tion, see his family doctor regularly, and have a review of his need for medication if he remains seizure-free for 18 months.
The patient leaves with a clear idea of his likely prognosis.
A PARADIGM SHIFT Thomas Kuhn has described scientific paradigms as ways of looking at the world that define both the problems that can legitimately be addressed and the range of admissible evidence that may bear on their solution.4 When defects in an existing paradigm accumulate to the extent that the paradigm is no longer tenable, the paradigm is challenged and replaced by a new way of looking at the world. Medical practice is changing, and the change, which involves using the medical literature more effectively in guiding medical practice, is profound enough that it can appropriately be called a paradigm shift. The foundations of the paradigm shift lie in developments in clinical research over the last 30 years. In 1960, the ran¬ domized clinical trial was an oddity. It is now accepted that virtually no drug can enter clinical practice without a demon¬ stration of its efficacy in clinical trials. Moreover, the same randomized trial method increasingly is being applied to surgical therapies6 and diagnostic tests.6
Meta-analysis is gaining increasing ac¬ ceptance as a method of summarizing the results of a number of randomized trials, and ultimately may have as profound an effect on setting treatment policy as have randomized trials themselves.7 While less dramatic, crucial methodological ad-Downloaded From: http://jama.jamanetwork.com/ by a University of Ottawa User on 10/02/2014 vanees have also been made in other ar¬ eas, such as the assessment of diagnostic tests8·9 and prognosis.2 A new philosophy of medical practice and teaching has followed these meth¬ odological advances. This paradigm shift is manifested in a number of ways. A profusion of articles has been published instructing clinicians on how to access,10 evaluate,11 and interpret12 the medical literature. Proposals to apply the prin¬ ciples of clinical epidemiology to dayto-day clinical practice have been put forward.3 A number of major medical journals have adopted a more informa¬ tive structured abstract format, which incorporates issues of methods and de¬ sign into the portion of an article the reader sees first.13 The American Col¬ lege of Physicians has launched a jour¬ nal, ACP Journal Club, that summa¬ rizes new publications of high relevance and methodological rigor.14 Textbooks that provide a rigorous review of avail¬ able evidence, including a methods sec¬ tion describing both the methodological criteria used to systematically evaluate the validity of the clinical evidence and the quantitative techniques used for summarizing the evidence, have begun to appear.1516 Practice guidelines based on rigorous methodological review of the available evidence are increasingly com¬ mon.17 A final manifestation is the grow¬ ing demand for courses and seminars that instruct physicians on how to make more effective use of the medical liter¬ ature in their day-to-day patient care. 3 We call the new paradigm "evidencebased medicine."18 In this article, we de¬ scribe how this approach differs from prior practice and briefly outline how we are building a residency program in which a key goal is to practice, act as a role model, teach, and help residents become highly adept in evidence-based medicine. We also describe some of the problems educators and medical prac¬ titioners face in implementing the new paradigm. The Former Paradigm
The former paradigm was based on the following assumptions about the knowledge required to guide clinical practice.
1. Unsystematic observations from clinical experience are a valid way of building and maintaining one's knowl¬ edge about patient prognosis, the value of diagnostic tests, and the efficacy of treatment.
2. The study and understanding of basic mechanisms of disease and pathophysiologic principles are a sufficient guide for clinical practice. 3 . A combination of thorough tradi¬ tional medical training and common sense is sufficient to allow one to eval¬ uate new tests and treatments. 4 . Content expertise and clinical ex¬ perience are a sufficient base from which to generate valid guidelines for clinical practice.
According to this paradigm clinicians have a number of options for sorting out clinical problems they face. They can reflect on their own clinical experience, reflect on the underlying biology, go to a textbook, or ask a local expert. Read¬ ing the introduction and discussion sec¬ tions of a paper could be considered an appropriate way of gaining the relevant information from a current journal. This paradigm puts a high value on traditional scientific authority and ad¬ herence to standard approaches, and an¬ swers are frequently sought from direct contact with local experts or reference to the writings ofinternational experts.19
The New Paradigm The assumptions of the new paradigm are as follows:
1. Clinical experience and the devel¬ opment of clinical instincts (particularly with respect to diagnosis) are a crucial and necessary part of becoming a com¬ petent physician. Many aspects of clin¬ ical practice cannot, or will not, ever be adequately tested. Clinical experience and its lessons are particularly impor¬ tant in these situations. At the same time, systematic attempts to record ob¬ servations in a reproducible and unbi¬ ased fashion markedly increase the con¬ fidence one can have in knowledge about patient prognosis, the value of diagnos¬ tic tests, and the efficacy of treatment.
In the absence of systematic observa¬ tion one must be cautious in the inter¬ pretation of information derived from clinical experience and intuition, for it may at times be misleading. 2 3. Understanding certain rules of evidence is necessary to correctly in¬ terpret literature on causation, progno¬ sis, diagnostic tests, and treatment strategy.
It follows that clinicians should reg¬ ularly consult the original literature (and be able to critically appraise the meth¬ ods and results sections) in solving clin¬ ical problems and providing optimal pa¬ tient care. It also follows that clinicians must be ready to accept and live with uncertainty and to acknowledge that management decisions are often made in the face of relative ignorance of their true impact.
The new paradigm puts a much lower value on authority.20 The underlying be¬ lief is that physicians can gain the skills to make independent assessments ofev¬ idence and thus evaluate the credibility of opinions being offered by experts. The decreased emphasis on authority does not imply a rejection of what one can learn from colleagues and teachers, whose years of experience have provid¬ ed them with insight into methods of history taking, physical examination, and diagnostic strategies. This knowledge can never be gained from formal scien¬ tific investigation. A final assumption of the new paradigm is that physicians whose practice is based on an under¬ standing of the underlying evidence will provide superior patient care.
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PRACTICE OF EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE
The role modeling, practice, and teach¬ ing of evidence-based medicine requires skills that are not traditionally part of medical training. These include precise¬ ly defining a patient problem, and what information is required to resolve the problem; conducting an efficient search of the literature; selecting the best of the relevant studies and applying rules of evidence to determine their validity3; being able to present to colleagues in a succinct fashion the content of the ar¬ ticle and its strengths and weaknesses; and extracting the clinical message and applying it to the patient problem. We will refer to this process as the critical appraisal exercise.
Evidence-based medicine also involves applying traditional skills of medical training. A sound understanding of pathophysiology is necessary to inter¬ pret and apply the results of clinical re¬ search. For instance, most patients to whom we would like to generalize the results of randomized trials would, for one reason or another, not have been enrolled in the most relevant study. The patient may be too old, be too sick, have other underlying illnesses, or be unco¬ operative. Understanding the underly¬ ing pathophysiology allows the clinician to better judge whether the results are applicable to the patient at hand and also has a crucial role as a conceptual and memory aid.
Another traditional skill required of the evidence-based physician is a sen¬ sitivity to patients' emotional needs. Un¬ derstanding patients' suffering21 and how that suffering can be ameliorated by the caring and compassionate physician are Greenfield and colleagues24 that demonstrated the pos¬ itive effects of increasing patients' in¬ volvement with their care) may be appropriate.
Since evidence-based medicine in¬ volves skills of problem defining, search¬ ing, evaluating, and applying original medical literature, it is incumbent on residency programs to teach these skills. Understanding the barriers to educat¬ ing physicians-in-training in evidencebased medicine can lead to more effec¬ tive teaching strategies.
EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE IN A MEDICAL RESIDENCY
The Internal Medicine Residency Pro¬ gram at McMaster University has an explicit commitment to producing prac¬ titioners of evidence-based medicine.
While other clinical departments at
McMaster have devoted themselves to teaching evidence-based medicine, the commitment is strongest in the Depart¬ ment of Medicine. We will therefore fo¬ cus on the Internal Medicine Residency in our discussion and briefly outline some of the strategies we are using in imple¬ menting the paradigm shift.
1. The residents spend each Wednes¬ day afternoon at an academic half-day. At the beginning of each new academic year, the rules of evidence that relate to articles concerning therapy, diagnosis, prognosis, and overviews are reviewed. In subsequent sessions, the discussion is built around a clinical case, and two original articles that bear on the prob¬ lem are presented. The residents are responsible for critically appraising the articles and arriving at bottom lines re¬ garding the strength of evidence and how it bears on the clinical problem. They learn to present the methods and results in a succinct fashion, emphasiz¬ ing only the key points. A wide-ranging discussion, including issues of underly¬ ing pathophysiology and related ques¬ tions of diagnosis and management, fol¬ lows presentation of the articles.
The second part of the half-day is de¬ voted to the physical examination. Clin¬ ical teachers present optimal techniques of examination with attention to what is known about their reproducibility and accuracy.
2. Facilities for computerized litera¬ ture searching are available on the teach¬ ing medical ward in each of the four teaching hospitals. Costs of searching are absorbed by the residency program.
Residents not familiar with computer searching, or the Grateful Med program we use, are instructed at the beginning of the rotation. Research in our insti¬ tution has shown that MEDLINE searching from clinical settings is fea¬ sible with brief training.26 A subsequent investigation demonstrated that inter¬ nal medicine house staff who have com¬ puter access on the ward and feedback concerning their searching do an aver¬ age of more than 3.6 searches per month.26 House staff believe that more than 90% oftheir searches that are stim¬ ulated by a patient problem lead to some improvement in patient care. 25 3. Assessment of searching and crit¬ ical appraisal skills is being incorporat¬ ed into the evaluation of residents. 4 . We believe that the new paradigm will remain an academic mirage with little relation to the world of day-to-day clinical practice unless physicians-intraining are exposed to role models who practice evidence-based medicine. As a result, the residency program has placed major emphasis on ensuring this exposure.
First, a focus of recruitment for our Department of Medicine faculty has been internists with training in clinical epidemiology. These individuals have the skills and commitment to practice evi¬ dence-based medicine. The residency program works to ensure they have clin-ical teaching roles available to them.
Second, a program of more rigorous evaluation of attending physicians has been instituted. One of the areas eval¬ uated is the extent to which attending physicians are effective in teaching ev¬ idence-based medicine. The relevant items from the evaluation form are re¬ produced in the Table. Third, because it is new to both teach¬ ers and learners, and because most clin¬ ical teachers have observed few role models and have not received formal training, teaching evidence-based med¬ icine is not easy. To help attending phy¬ sicians improve their skills in this area, we have encouraged them to form part¬ nerships, which involve attending the partner's clinical rounds, making obser¬ vations, and providing formal feedback. One learns through observation and through criticisms of one's performance. A number of faculty members have par¬ ticipated in this program.
To further facilitate attending physi¬ cians' improving their skills, the De¬ partment of Medicine held a retreat de¬ voted to sharing strategies for effective clinical teaching. Part of the workshop, attended by more than 30 faculty mem¬ bers, was devoted to teaching evidencebased medicine. Some of the strategies that were adduced are briefly summa¬ rized in the next section.
EFFECTIVE TEACHING OF EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE

Role Modeling
Attending physicians must be enthu¬ siastic, effective role models for the prac¬ tice of evidence-based medicine (even in high-pressure clinical settings, such as intensive care units). Providing a model goes a long way toward inculcating at¬ titudes that lead learners to develop skills in critical appraisal. Acting as a role model involves specifying the strength of evidence that supports clin¬ ical decisions. In one case, the teacher can point to a number of large random¬ ized trials, rigorously reviewed and in¬ cluded in a meta-analysis, which allows one to say how many patients one must treat to prevent a death. In other cases, the best evidence may come from ac-cepted practice or one's clinical experi¬ ence and instincts. The clinical teacher should make it clear to learners on what basis decisions are being made. This can be done efficiently. For instance:
Prospective studies suggest that Mr Jones' risk of a major vascular event in the first year after his infarct is 4%; a meta-analysis of randomized trials of aspirin in this situa¬ tion suggests a risk reduction of 25%; we would have to treat 100 such patients to pre¬ vent an event21; given the minimal expense and toxicity of low-dose, enteric-coated as¬ pirin, treating Mr Jones is clearly warranted.
Or:
How longto treat a patient with antibiotics fol¬ lowing pneumonia has not been systematically studied; so, my recommendation that we give Mrs Smith 3 days of intravenous antibiotics and treat her for a total of 10 days is arbitrary; somewhat shorter or longer courses of treat¬ ment would be equally reasonable.
In the latter type of situation, dog¬ matic or rigid insistence on following a particular course of action would not be appropriate.
Critical Appraisal
It is crucial that critical appraisal is¬ sues arise from patient problems that the learner is currently confronting, demonstrating that critical appraisal is a pragmatic and central aspect, not an academic or tangential element of op¬ timal patient care. The problem select¬ ed for critical appraisal must be one that the learners recognize as important, feel uncertain, and do not fully trust expert opinion; in other words, they must feel it is worth the effort to find out what the literature says on a topic. The likeliest candidate topics are common problems where learners have been exposed to divergent opinions (and thus there is disagreement and/or uncertainty among the learners). The clinical teacher should keep these requirements in mind when considering questions to encourage the learners to address. It can be useful to ask all members of the group their opin¬ ion about the clinical problem at hand. One can then ensure that the problem is appropriate for a critical appraisal ex¬ ercise by asking the group the following questions: 
Misapprehensions About
Evidence-Based Medicine
In developing the practice and teach¬ ing of evidence-based medicine at our institution, we have found that the na¬ ture of the new paradigm is sometimes misinterpreted. Recognizing the limita¬ tions of intuition, experience, and un¬ derstanding of pathophysiology in per¬ mitting strong inferences may be mis¬ interpreted as rejecting these routes to knowledge. Specific misinterpretations ofevidence-based medicine and their cor¬ rections follow: Misinterpretation 1.-Evidencebased medicine ignores clinical experi¬ ence and clinical intuition.
Correction.-On the contrary, it is important to expose learners to excep¬ tional clinicians who have a gift for in¬ tuitive diagnosis, a talent for precise observation, and excellent judgment in making difficult management decisions. Untested signs and symptoms should not be rejected out of hand. They may prove extremely useful and ultimately be proved valid through rigorous test¬ ing. The more the experienced clinicians can dissect the process they use in di¬ agnosis,31 and clearly present it to learn¬ ers, the greater the benefit. Similarly, the gain for students will be greatest when clues to optimal diagnosis and treatment are culled from the barrage of clinical information in a systematic and reproducible fashion. Institutional experience can also pro¬ vide important insights. Diagnostic tests may differ in their accuracy depending on the skill of the practitioner. A local expert in, for instance, diagnostic ultra¬ sound may produce far better results than the average from the published lit¬ erature. The effectiveness and compli¬ cations associated with therapeutic in¬ terventions, particularly surgical pro¬ cedures, may also differ among institu¬ tions. When optimal care is taken to both record observations reproducibly and avoid bias, clinical and institutional experience evolves into the systematic search for knowledge that forms the core of evidence-based medicine.32 Misinterpretation 2.-Understand¬ ing ofbasic investigation and pathophysiology plays no part in evidence-based medicine.
Correction.-The dearth of adequate evidence demands that clinical problem solving must rely on an understanding of underlying pathophysiology. More¬ over, a good understanding of patho¬ physiology is necessary for interpreting clinical observations and for appropri¬ ate interpretation of evidence (especial¬ ly in deciding on its generalizability). Misinterpretation 3.-Evidencebased medicine ignores standard aspects of clinical training, such as the physical examination.
Correction.-Careful history taking and physical examination provide much, and often the best, evidence for diag¬ nosis and direct treatment decisions. The clinical teacher of evidence-based med¬ icine must give considerable attention to teaching the methods of history tak¬ ing and clinical examination, with par¬ ticular attention to which items have demonstrated validity and to strategies that enhance observer agreement.
Barriers to Teaching
Evidence-Based Medicine Difficulties we have encountered in teaching evidence-based medicine in¬ clude the following: 1. Many house staff start with rudi¬ mentary critical appraisal skills and the topic may be threatening for them.
2. People like quick and easy answers. Cookbook medicine has its appeal. Crit¬ ical appraisal involves additional time and effort and may be perceived as in¬ efficient and distracting from the real goal (to provide optimal care for pa¬ tients). 3 . For many clinical questions, highquality evidence is lacking. If such ques¬ tions predominate in attempts to intro¬ duce critical appraisal, a sense of futility can result.
4. The concepts of evidence-based medicine are met with skepticism by many faculty members who are there¬ fore unenthusiastic about modifying their teaching and practice in accordance with its dictates. These problems can be ameliorated by use of the strategies described in the previous section on effective teaching of evidence-based medicine. Threat can be reduced by making a contract with the residents, which sets out modest and achievable goals, and further reduced by the attending physician role model¬ ing the practice of evidence-based med¬ icine. Inefficiency can be reduced by teaching effective searching skills and simple guidelines for assessing the va¬ lidity of the papers. In addition, one can emphasize that critical appraisal as a strategy for solving clinical problems is most appropriate when the problems are common in one's own practice. Futility can be reduced by, particularly initially, targeting critical appraisal exercises to areas in which there is likely to be highquality evidence that will affect clinical decisions. Skepticism of faculty mem¬ bers can be reduced by the availability of "quick and dirty" (as well as more sophisticated) courses on critical apprais¬ al of evidence and by the teaching part¬ nerships and teaching workshops de¬ scribed earlier.
Many problems in the practice and teaching of evidence-based medicine re¬ main. Many physicians, including both residents and faculty members, are still skeptical about the tenets of the new paradigm. A medical residency is full of competing demands, and the appropri¬ ate balance between goals is not always evident. At the same time, we are buoyed by the number of residents and faculty who have enthusiastically adopted the new approach and found ways to inte¬ grate it into their learning and practice. Barriers to Practicing
Evidence-Based Medicine
Even if our residency program is suc¬ cessful in producing graduates who en¬ ter the world of clinical practice enthu¬ siastic to apply what they have learned about evidence-based medicine, they will face difficult challenges. Economic con¬ straints and counterproductive incen¬ tives may compete with the dictates of evidence as determinants of clinical de¬ cisions; the relevant literature may not be readily accessible; and the time avail¬ able may be insufficient to carefully re¬ view the evidence (which may be volu¬ minous) relevant to a pressing clinical problem.
Some solutions to these problems are already available. Optimal integration of computer technology into clinical prac¬ tice facilitates finding and accessing ev¬ idence. Reference to literature over-views meeting scientific principles30,33 and collections of methodologically sound and highly relevant articles14 can mark¬ edly increase efficiency. Other solutions will emerge over time. Health educa¬ tors will continue to find better ways of role modeling and teaching evidencebased medicine. Standards in writing reviews and texts are likely to change, with a greater focus on methodological rigor.15·16 Evidence-based summaries will therefore become increasingly available. Practical approaches to making evi¬ dence-based summaries easier to apply in clinical practice, many based on com¬ puter technology, will be developed and expanded. As described earlier, we are already using computer searching on the ward. In the future, the results of di¬ agnostic tests may be provided with the associated sensitivity, specificity, and likelihood ratios. Health policymakers may find that the structure of medical practice must be shifted in basic ways to facilitate the practice of evidence-based medicine. Increasingly, scientific over¬ views will be systematically integrated with information regarding toxicity and side effects, cost, and the consequences of alternative courses of action to de¬ velop clinical policy guidelines.34 The prospects for these developments are both bright and exciting.
DOES TEACHING AND LEARNING EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE IMPROVE PATIENT OUTCOMES?
The proof of the pudding of evidencebased medicine lies in whether patients cared for in this fashion enjoy better health. This proof is no more achievable for the new paradigm than it is for the old, for no long-term randomized trials of traditional and evidence-based med¬ ical education are likely to be carried out. What we do have are a number of short-term studies which confirm that the skills of evidence-based medicine can be taught to medical students35 and med¬ ical residents.36 In addition, a study com¬ pared the graduates of a medical school that operates under the new paradigm (McMaster) with the graduates of a tra¬ ditional school. A random sample of McMaster graduates who had chosen careers in family medicine were more knowledgeable with respect to current therapeutic guidelines in the treatment of hypertension than were the gradu¬ ates of the traditional school.37 These results suggest that the teaching of ev¬ idence-based medicine may help grad¬ uates stay up-to-date. Further evalua¬ tion of the evidence-based medicine ap¬ proach is necessary.
Our advocating evidence-based med¬ icine in the absence of definitive evi¬ dence of its superiority in improving pa-tient outcomes may appear to be an in¬ ternal contradiction. As has been point¬ ed out, however, evidence-based medicine does not advocate a rejection of all innovations in the absence of de¬ finitive evidence. When definitive evi¬ dence is not available, one must fall back on weaker evidence (such as the com¬ parison of graduates of two medical schools that use different approaches cited above) and on biologic rationale. The rationale in this case is that physi¬ cians who are up-to-date as a function of their ability to read the current litera¬ ture critically, and are able to distin¬ guish strong from weaker evidence, are likely to be more judicious in the ther¬ apy they recommend. Physicians who understand the properties of diagnostic tests and are able to use a quantitative approach to those tests are likely to make more accurate diagnoses. While this ra¬ tionale appears compelling to us, com¬ pelling rationale has often proved mis¬ leading. Until more definitive evidence is adduced, adoption of evidence-based medicine should appropriately be re¬ stricted to two groups. One group com¬ prises those who find the rationale com¬ pelling, and thus believe that use of the evidence-based medicine approach is likely to improve clinical care. A second group comprises those who, while skep¬ tical of improvements in patient out¬ come, believe it is very unlikely that deterioration in care results from the evidence-based approach and who find that the practice of medicine in the new paradigm is more exciting and fun.
CONCLUSION
Based on an awareness of the limita¬ tions of traditional determinants of clin¬ ical decisions, a new paradigm for med¬ ical practice has arisen. Evidence-based medicine deals directly with the uncer¬ tainties of clinical medicine and has the potential for transforming the educa¬ tion and practice of the next generation of physicians. These physicians will con¬ tinue to face an exploding volume of literature, rapid introduction of new technologies, deepening concern about burgeoning medical costs, and increas¬ ing attention to the quality and outcomes of medical care. The likelihood that ev¬ idence-based medicine can help amelio¬ rate these problems should encourage its dissemination.
Evidence-based medicine will require new skills for the physician, skills that residency programs should be equipped to teach. While strategies for inculcat¬ ing the principles ofevidence-based med¬ icine remain to be refined, initial expe¬ rience has revealed a number of effec¬ tive approaches. Incorporating these practices into postgraduate medical ed-ucation and continuing to work on their further development will result in more rapid dissemination and integration of the new paradigm into medical practice.
